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Contemporary architectural discourse mostly assumes an unmediated link between architecture and
culture. This is a historical assumption, however, rooted in colonial encounters when the notion of
cultural difference rst entered the architectural scene. In the rst part of my article, I focus on a
statement by Vitruvius that provides ways of thinking about architecture outside cultural identity
categories. In the second part, I analyze two nineteenth-century texts to show both the cultural
inscriptions of architectural discourse and their breaking points. Finally, I argue that recognizing the
historicity of the relationship between architecture and culture involves problematizing architecture
as an identity category as much as questioning culture as an architectural category.
The fact that house form can now be the
domain of fashion suggests the general validity
of the concept of criticality and the primacy of
socio-cultural factors, and all that this implies
for the understanding of house form, as well as
its choice.1
—Amos Rapoport
From theology to commerce, from war to pri-
vate pleasure, from mysticism to technology,
the range of Islamic culture is expressed in a
supremely assured series of buildings.2
—George Michell
As I have endeavored to show in this book
through many examples from across the world,
the dwellings of mankind represent the com-
plex interaction of many aspects of culture
essential to specic societies.3
—Paul Oliver
To understand each house; its form, hierarchy
and spatial arrangement, it is necessary to
“excavate” through several layers of cultural
inuences.4
—Robert Powell
A naturalized link between architecture and culture
connects these statements, which come from di-
verse scholarly positions in the last four decades
of the past century. Such examples can be multi-
plied. An unproblematic, ahistorical and a priori link
between architecture and culture underlies much of
contemporary architectural discourse. Questions
multiply. What is at stake in architecture’s discipli-
nary obsession with cultural identity? What are the
mechanisms that relate architecture to culture?
What is architecture, and what is culture in the rst
place? In posing these questions, I do not intend to
invoke historical and geographical differences
between building types and architectural styles.
What I ask here is to what extent architecture needs
cultural identication for its universal legitimization.
Is it possible to speak of architecture outside of
culture?
Culture as a eld of scholarly inquiry is inextri-
cably linked to the disciplines of ethnography and
anthropology. Furthermore, from the early nine-
teenth century on, notions of art and culture have
been closely allied. As James Clifford points out,
“art and culture emerged after 1800 as mutually
reinforcing domains of human value, strategies for
gathering, marking off, protecting the best and
most interesting creations of ‘man.’”5 He also
emphasizes that notions of wholeness, continuity,
and essence are embedded in Western ideas of cul-
ture and art. In the past two decades, a large num-
ber of scholars besides Clifford have addressed the
colonial agendas that underlie this viewpoint and
how it reinforced ethnic and racial hierarchies to
consolidate the power of colonial domination.6 The
twentieth-century notion of cultural relativity
(rather than hierarchy) that prevailed simultaneously
with the historical phenomenon of decolonization
hardly challenged the idea of culture as a unied
category. It was one of the central preoccupations
of postcolonial studies to dismantle this under-
standing, largely due to historical circumstances.
For, if colonization enabled the production of
homogenous cultural identity categories, the post-
colonial world staged a different scenario that chal-
lenged the colonizer-colonized binary and unsettled
xed notions of identication. The major task of
postcolonial theory has been to focus on such
notions as hybridity, displacement, decentering, and
transculturation to question unifying and hegemonic
cultural categories that privilege the Western world.
As one of the leading proponents of postcolonial
theory, Homi Bhabha, put it:
The reality of the limit or limit-text of culture
is rarely theorized outside of well-intentioned
moralist polemics against prejudice and stereo-
type, or the blanket assertion of individual or
institutional racism—that describe the effect
rather than the structure of the problem. The
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need to think the limit of culture as a problem
of the enunciation of cultural difference is dis-
avowed.7
Bhabha calls for the recognition of cultural dif-
ference based on the negation of the notion of cul-
ture as a stable system of reference. Informed by
poststructuralist and psychoanalytical theories, he
insists that all cultural systems are constructed in an
ambivalent space of enunciation and a discontinu-
ous time of translation and negotiation.
Such work has been and continues to be sig-
nicant not only to criticize the effects of colonial-
ism and to undo colonial texts but also to make
architectural sense out of the postcolonial world,
which unsettles given disciplinary and cultural
boundaries. However, despite the critical work that
problematized the notion of culture, the idea of
“architecture as cultural expression” is still dominant
in the architectural scene. The critique of this posi-
tion is inscribed by a double burden because the
deconstruction of culture needs to be articulated
with the deconstruction of architecture as a similarly
problematic identity category. “What is architec-
ture?” is an exhausted question, always connected
to an unacknowledged desire to secure a discipli-
nary boundary. The very question “What is?”
assumes an a priori existence to architecture as a
denable entity. It is based on the assumption that
architecture exists before it is named as such, that
there is an ahistorical and universally recognizable
domain of architecture, the contents of which can
be known. Any answer to “What is architecture?”
draws a disciplinary boundary and xes its contents.
It is obsessed with dening exclusions as much as
inclusions.
Indeed, the boundaries of architecture and its
disciplinary inclusions and exclusions have received
critical acclaim in the last decade. Critical theorists
scrutinized both the institutional mechanisms that
dene and constitute architecture as a universal
eld of knowledge and the underlying assumptions
of the disciplinary canon that had been consoli-
dated predominantly in Italy, France, Germany, and
England since the sixteenth century.8 By the nine-
teenth century, the primacy of vision, the autonomy
of architectural form, and the genius of the master
subject formed the well-established bases to recite
the foundational myths of the architectural disci-
pline.9 Magali Sarfatti Larson’s sociological approach
to the institutional bases of the perpetuation of
such premises, Mark Wigley’s poststructuralist focus
on the historical instability of the canon, Elizabeth
Grosz’s Deleuzian call to think architecture different
than a bounded identity category are a few exam-
ples to show the diversity of critical angles.10 Speak-
ing of the location of the architectural canon, Mir-
iam Gusevich mentions that “it spoke Latin, the
language of the Church and of the court.”11 In the
past decade, themes of race, ethnicity, and sexuality
have entered architectural discourse in unprece-
dented ways. Critics effectively showed that the sta-
bility and presumed universality of the canon have
historically involved repressions of sexuality, ethnic-
ity, and race.
My question then is, if such themes as sexual-
ity, ethnicity, and race are tied to architecture in
historically specic ways, what about the notion of
culture? Where and when did culture appear as an
architectural category? Postcolonial approaches
have claried how non-Western cultures are
repressed by the canon but to what extent can
architectural discourse afford to involve cultural
identity as one of its ingredients?12 In posing these
questions, I propose to see not only culture but also
architecture as an identity category and signication
rather than a stable and secure autonomous entity.13
In doing so, I follow a proposition of psychoanalyti-
cal theory: any identity category is constituted both
by its relationship to the Other and by an unsym-
bolizable kernel that cannot be incorporated into
the social symbolic order.14 In other words, an irre-
ducible lack forms the basis of identity. No identity
is ever complete. It is only through fantasy that the
lack can be covered and a temporary illusion of full-
ness can be achieved.15 As identity categories, both
culture and architecture are signicatory entities
with constructed rather than a priori and stable
boundaries.
The articulation of the critique of architecture
as a historically founded discipline and the notion
of culture as a historically determined constitution
call for attention not only to understand the effort-
lessly naturalized link between architecture and cul-
ture but also to undo uncritical architectural gener-
alizations based on cultural and geographical
identication. It should be clear by now that my
concern here is not to provide a comfortably broad
denition of architecture that can account for an
innite range of cultural locations. Instead, I ask
how and where the term architecture is mobilized
and in whose interest? Where does the question
“what is architecture” come from? Is cultural differ-
ence inherent to this question, or do notions of uni-
versality and cultural difference have a history in
relation to architecture?
So, What Is Architecture?
Every architecture student is familiar with Vitruvius’s
rmitas, utilitas, venustas, which is arguably the
most common reference to any denition of the
discipline. Clearly, the treatise of the ancient Roman
theorist, Ten Books on Architecture, has signicant
implications regarding the search for a timeless de-
nition of architecture.16 However, I think that the
text’s relevance today is less due to the architectural
certainties that it provides than to the productive
ambiguities that underlie some of the arguments. In
his treatise, before going into details of the charac-
teristics and use of various architectural materials
and elements, Vitruvius includes two sections on the
education of the architect and the fundamental
principles of architecture. From the outset, he
clearly states that “practice” and “reasoning” are
two indispensable components of architecture.
Whereas practice corresponds to manual labor, rea-
soning constitutes theory, which he explains as
“what can demonstrate and explain the proportions
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of completed works skillfully and systematically.”17
To explicate this point further, he continues:
Thus architects who strove to obtain practical
manual skills but lacked an education have
never been able to achieve an inuence equal
to the quality of their exertions; on the other
hand, those who placed their trust entirely in
theory and in writings seem to have chased
after a shadow, not something real. But those
who have fully mastered both skills, armed, if
you will, in full panoply, those architects have
reached their goal more quickly and inuen-
tially.
According to Vitruvius, the material sub-
stance—that is, building— needs to be authorized
by theory—that is, language —to be qualied as
architecture. The elements that endow the object
with architectural authority are both language and
materiality. Vitruvius further claries his distinction
between theory and practice in the section where
he locates the origin of dwelling in shelters assem-
bled by raw materials from nature.18 According to
him, nature allows humans to produce shelters but
these are not-yet-architecture. To be qualied as
architecture, the production of a building has to
involve literary, geometrical, historical, philosophical,
musical, medical, legal, and astronomical knowl-
edge. Following his distinction between manual
skills and scholarship, Vitruvius makes the following
crucial statement:
Both in general and especially in architecture
are these two things found; that which signies
and that which is signied. That which is signi-
ed is the thing proposed about which we
speak; that which signies is the demonstra-
tion unfolded in systems of precepts.19
I nd this an astoundingly astute statement
open for interpretation far beyond the scope and
aim of Vitruvius’s text. The statement “that which
is signied is the thing proposed about which we
speak” points to a state prior to architecture. In ref-
erence to this state, Vitruvius uses the term the
thing. The thing is nothing prior to signication. It
refers to an irrecoverable state, a pre-architectural
plenitude, prior to signication. In other words,
Vitruvius’s statement does not assume an a priori
correspondence between “that which is signied”
and “that which signies.” It is the latter that xes
the meaning of the former. Here architecture
emerges as an empty category that retroactively
xes the relationship between things and their sig-
nication. In explaining the Lacanian theory of sig-
nication, Slavoj Zizek asks, “But is not the point of
the Lacanian notion of the retroactive temporality
of meaning, of signied as the circular effect of the
signier’s chain, and so on, precisely that meaning
always comes ‘later,’ that the notion of ‘always-
already there’ is the true imaginary illusion-
misrecognition?”20 In Vitruvius’s discourse, the
meaning of architecture is xed only after the thing
is named as such. There is a certain sense of arbi-
trariness here. Before being named, the thing is
open to endless signicatory possibilities. By choos-
ing to call it architecture, the theorist endows it
with a specic identity. Architecture includes a
selected number of things and excludes others. Its
boundary not only denes but also is dened by its
contents.
The task of architectural discourse then is to
ll up that empty space of signication, that is,
architecture, by strategic inclusions and exclusions.
As an identity category, architecture has to distin-
guish itself from what it is not. In Vitruvius’s
scheme, any built object is a thing that awaits signi-
cation. It is not-yet-inside architecture so far as it
is not signied, but not quite outside either as it
holds the potential for signicatory propriety. Say-
ing that architecture is an empty category does not
mean that it is a neutral one, however. On the con-
trary, a hegemonic identication of the term always
emerges to colonize that negative space. The uni-
versal claims of architecture mark but the coloniza-
tion of that space by a particular content. However,
Zizek states that, “the ultimate question is not
which particular content hegemonizes the empty
universality (and, thus, in the struggle for hege-
mony, excludes other particular contents); the ulti-
mate question is which specic content has to be
excluded so that the very empty form of universality
emerges as the “battleeld” for hegemony.”21 Com-
plex historical entanglements of institutions, dis-
courses, and practices determine architecture’s
exclusions. Most importantly, the architectural grid
of inclusions and exclusions is historically consti-
tuted and marked by historical shifts. The question
then is what specic things have been historically
problematized in the construction of a disciplinary
ground for architecture? And, more importantly
perhaps, how do the mechanisms of inclusion and
exclusion operate, and what are the stakes
involved?
For Vitruvius, the threshold between architec-
ture and nonarchitecture is marked by the notion of
shelter. In his discourse, shelters built of raw materi-
als hold an ambivalent status in relation to architec-
ture. They are inside as they resemble architecture
but outside as they do not involve learned dis-
course, which is an essential element in his deni-
tion of the discipline. Hence, Vitruvius relegates
shelters to the status of architectural origin. Inter-
estingly, the notion of cultural diversity is not
absent from this argument. He mentions “foreign
nations” from Greece to Spain in reference to their
use of different building materials. These examples
help him explain the origin of architecture.22 A simi-
lar viewpoint appears later in Alberti’s writings, too.
The renowned Renaissance theorist offers a brief
history of architecture in Ten Books of Architecture
under the subtitle “That Architecture Began in
Asia, Flourished in Greece, and Was Brought to Per-
fection in Italy.”23 For these authors, the fundamen-
tal issue is to trace the origins of architecture-as-
they-dened-it. Other cultures merely multiply the
examples in explaining the development of architec-
ture from primitive beginnings. In Alberti’s text,
which clearly aims at legitimizing the superiority of
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Italian architecture, others enter the scene as its
less-developed versions. What is signicant for him
is the primitiveness of, say, Asian architecture and
not the Asianness of primitive architecture. In other
words, the naturalized ground of architectural iden-
tication is not challenged by cultural difference.
In these discourses, differences between various
architectural cultures do not call for theoretical
elaboration.
Architecture “and” Culture
Vitruvius’s stance on the relationship between archi-
tecture and culture was hardly challenged until the
colonial encounters, which marks a decisive histori-
cal moment. It is the moment when cultural particu-
larity enters the scene of architecture in unprece-
dented ways and marks a potential shift in the
structuring principles of the discipline. The notion
of colonial moment is an abstraction, of course,
which I use in reference to an epistemological rather
than a sociopolitical phenomenon. It refers to a
shift of knowledge in addressing the problem of
cultural difference rather than the historical and
contextual conditions of that shift, which would
involve the consideration of the unequal develop-
ment of colonization in different national contexts.24
I would argue that, from the colonial moment
onward, the relationship between “that which signi-
es” and “that which is signied” was inscribed less
by the difference between architecture and shelter
than the tension between a universal notion of
architecture and the relative status of buildings from
different cultural contexts.
The opposition of universality and cultural par-
ticularity—that is, the universal space of architec-
ture versus particular architectural cultures—is
closely linked to the historical scene of colonial
encounters. This duality is inscribed by a destabiliz-
ing threat to the boundaries of the discipline. Until
colonial encounters Western architectural history
and theory did not have to attend to cultural partic-
ularity as a sign of architectural difference. In
England, France, and Germany, for example, archi-
tectural history was associated with the antiquarian
study of the local Gothic past, which resonated with
nationalist and religious overtones. In Italy, on the
other hand, a rationalist interpretation of neoclassi-
cal architectural theory took central stage.25 In the
process of colonization, the West’s encounter with
its outside also marked its encounter with the
known limits of architecture. The tenuous boundary
that separated architecture from nonarchitecture
was challenged. Thereafter, the accumulated written
architectural tradition of the West was articulated
with its privileged position as colonizer and success-
fully established as the disciplinary canon. James
Fergusson’s work on Indian architecture in which he
judges the congruity of ornamentation, construc-
tion, and function and Thomas Karsten and Henri
Maclaine Pont’s assessment of Javanese architec-
ture based on formal, structural, and functional
appropriateness are but two examples to illustrate
this point.26 In these and other instances, the Vitru-
vian criteria of rmitas, utilitas, and venustas were
applied to non-Western architectures with alarming
ease. Upon close examination, however, neither Fer-
gusson nor Karsten and Maclaine Pont were totally
at ease with their assessments. Whereas the former
struggled with ranking the “original and varied”
forms of Indian architecture among the “intellectual
supremacy of Greece” and the “moral greatness of
Rome,” the latter chose to remain silent on non-
tectonic aspects of Javanese architecture.27 Colonial
architectural encounters clearly resulted in an
uneasy and often ambivalent relationship between
the colonizers and the category of non-Western
architecture. How can that ambivalence be theo-
rized?
I would argue that colonial architectural
encounters resulted in a critical gap between “that
which signies” and “that which is signied.” The
architectural eld was ridden with a brief moment
of anxiety when unfamiliar terms appeared at its
door. This is an uncomfortable moment that points
to a space that lies beyond the given limits of disci-
plinary discourse and practice. The presumed com-
pleteness, coherence, and consistency of (Western)
architecture are threatened. A new question needs
to be addressed: What is architecture in relation to
the non-Western buildings that emerge at its limit?
But that is a dangerous question because it points
to the precariousness of disciplinary premises and
boundaries. An even more threatening question that
follows is whether architecture can ever be consti-
tuted as a complete, coherent, and consistent eld.
Following psychoanalytic theory’s proposal that any
identity category depends on a fundamental loss (a
state of being that precedes language), we may ask
whether the emergence of unfamiliar building forms
could have evoked such a state in relationship to
(Western) architectural discourse? Paradoxically, the
very term non-Western as an architectural category
reveals the condition of impossibility for the consti-
tution of architecture as a bounded totality. It indi-
cates that architecture needs a prex (that is, non-
Western) to accommodate other cultures than the
West. At one level, the term non-Western architec-
ture symbolizes a fantasy that voices over the
silence that enables the term architecture to be
uttered. It is a cultural category that covers over
architecture’s lack.
To argue this point further, I will focus on two
of the earliest texts from the West and the non-
West respectively: Sir Banister Fletcher’s A History
of Architecture on the Comparative Method for the
Student, Craftsman and Amateur (1901 edition) and
Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani (The Ottoman Architectural
Order, 1873), an edited book published by the
Ottoman government for the 1873 world exhibition
in Vienna.28 Both are inaugural texts in their respec-
tive elds. Fletcher’s book is the rst systematic
survey of world architecture, and Usul-u Mimari-i
Osmani is the rst to codify and historicize Ottoman
architecture. In confronting the West/non-West
divide, these texts reveal the ambiguities involved in
the juxtaposition of architectural and cultural cate-
gories. They also show the different effects that the
non of the non-West has in this divide. To perpetu-
ate their unequal relationship, the West needs the
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license to judge, and the non-West needs to be
legitimated. The inequality of these positions has
important strategic effects on the vocabulary of
architecture.29
At one level, A History of Architecture and
Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani bear unmistakable traces of
orientalism and occidentalism, respectively.
Fletcher’s history is one of the earliest Western
architectural surveys to address non-Western archi-
tectures in a comparative framework. Appearing
toward the end of the colonial era, it clearly reects
the desire to project the supremacy of the coloniz-
ers’ world. A History of Architecture consists of two
sections: “Historical Styles,” which is a chronological
account of western architecture, and “Non-
Historical Styles,” which includes non-western archi-
tectural cultures. According to the author, whereas
historical styles are based on the primacy of struc-
ture and construction, nonhistorical styles are overly
ornamented and lack constructional logic.30
Fletcher’s orientalist approach is most apparent in
his renowned frontispiece “Tree of Architecture,”
where nonhistorical styles branch out from the
“western” trunk of the tree with no room to grow
beyond the seventh-century mark (Figure 1). Plac-
ing Peruvian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Chinese, and Japa-
nese architecture at the lowest level of the trunk,
Fletcher leaves no doubt about the geographical,
ethnic, and racial biases that underlie the architec-
tural canon. His approach to architectural hierar-
chies clearly parallels the obsession of late-
eighteenth-century anatomists with constructing the
hierarchy of races to assert the supremacy of white-
ness.31 As such, Fletcher’s account is in line with the
mainstream approach of European orientalists.
Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani appeared in an intense
and reformative social and political context. This
was the time of the birth of Ottoman nationalism
with the aim of providing social cohesion between
the various ethnic and religious groups that consti-
tuted the empire.32 By the second half of the nine-
teenth century, mostly due to European scholarship
on Ottoman history, traditional chroniclers based on
1. The Tree of Architecture. (Sir Banister Fletcher, A History of
Architecture on the Comparative Method for the Student, Craftsman and
Amateur, 16th edition. (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1954), frontispiece.)
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2. The Conical order. (Halil Edhem et al., Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani
(Istanbul: 1873), plate II.)
3. The Diamond order. (Halil Edhem et al., Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani
(Istanbul: 1873), plate V.)
pedigree and divine sanction were replaced by a
new focus on race and ethnicity. Usul-u Mimari-i
Osmani marks part of a general shift of historio-
graphical focus from an Islamic to a national iden-
tity. This book also consists of two sections: “His-
torical Information” and “Various Orders.” The
former summarizes Ottoman architectural history
from the foundation of the empire. According to
this narrative, Ottoman architecture undergoes three
successive phases. Following relatively obscure
beginnings, it matures until the sixteenth century
when it attains perfection. The end of the seven-
teenth century, on the other hand, marks the begin-
ning of its decline period. This progression is sup-
ported by contextual explanations outside
architecture. The full realization of Ottoman archi-
tecture, that is, its purest state, coincides with the
most powerful era of the empire in political and
military terms. Its decline, on the other hand, is
explained by invasions from outside. According to
the authors, Ottoman architecture is polluted by
Byzantine and Arabian inuences at its early stages
and later by French and Armenian architects. Here,
the West appears as an undesirable agent whose
inuence disrupts the purity of Ottoman architec-
ture. This account is unmistakably rooted in the
Hegelian historiographical tradition, which empha-
sizes the divine dignity of art, the role of the collec-
tive (that is, nation) in artistic production and his-
torical determinism.33 The narrative of growth,
development, and decline in Ottoman architecture
and the notion of architecture as the expression of
societal transformations are indicative of the histo-
riographical background of Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani.
The second section of the book involves aes-
thetic codication. Parallel to the Doric, Ionic, and
Corinthian orders that are codied in Western archi-
tecture, the authors recognize three orders in the
Ottoman tradition: the Conical order (Tarz- Mimari-i
Müstevi), the Diamond order (Tarz- Mimari-i
Mahruti), and the Crystalline order (Tarz- Mimari-i
Mücevheri) (Figures 2, 3, 4). They then codify the
mathematical and proportional relations between
the constitutive parts of each order. The Hegelian
narrative and the architectural models of Usul-u
Mimari-i Osmani bear testimony to its occidentalist
inscription. It marks an attempt to defy Ottoman
marginality to the West by forging a cultural syn-
thesis using the privileged tools of Western repre-
sentation.
Although I think that it is extremely important
to surface and criticize the orientalist and occiden-
talist operations in A History of Architecture and
Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani, I propose that there are
other and more productive ways of reading these
texts. At one level, both of them point to a space
to think architecture differently by introducing new
terms to the disciplinary discourse as an inevitable
yet inadvertent result of the West/non-West divide.
Fletcher’s use of the term non-historical styles in a
book on the history of architectural styles reveals
the necessary impossibility of the inclusion of other
cultures to perpetuate the universalistic claims of
the West—necessary because architectural history
otherwise remains incomplete, impossible because
non-Western styles are nonhistorical. Furthermore,
throughout his book, Fletcher simultaneously
expresses fascination and contempt for these styles.
Paradoxical and ambivalent statements that
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4. The Crystalline order. (Halil Edhem et al., Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani
(Istanbul: 1873), plate VI.)
threaten the consistency of the text underwrite the
derogatory implications of the term nonhistorical.
Usul-u Mimari-i Osmani is also marked by a
destabilizing moment in its historiographical trajec-
tory. There, the separation of the narrative history
of Ottoman architecture from its formal analysis
points to the possibility of separating the materiality
of architecture from its cultural location. Whereas
the historical narrative is built upon the notion of
cultural identity, the stylistic account is based on
issues of architectural identity. Even the title, The
Ottoman Architectural Order, points toward a gap
between the notions of Ottoman architecture, which
has a cultural emphasis, and architectural order,
which has an architectural emphasis. At a broader
theoretical level, this gap raises the very question of
whether architecture can function independently of
homogenizing cultural identications. Furthermore,
by using the Western vocabulary as its basis, the
section on the Ottoman architectural order exposes
the arbitrariness of the association of architectural
orders with the West. The presumed uniqueness and
hegemonic superiority of Western architecture is
momentarily destabilized.
If, in Fletcher’s case, the term non-Western
burdens the category of architecture, Usul-u
Mimari-i Osmani shows how the term Ottoman is
burdened by architecture. There, Ottoman architec-
ture has to be legitimized by Western standards but
is polluted by Western architectural inuences. In
mimicking Western terms to enable the entry of
Ottoman architecture into the grand narrative of the
discipline while culturally debasing the West, this
text is an astute revelation of the ambiguities that
are embedded in the juxtaposition of cultural and
architectural identications. Clearly, the appearance
of a cultural element in the architectural scene
resulted in strategic adjustments that ultimately
consolidated the disciplinary canon. The new ele-
ment that threatened architecture’s dissolution was
hardly acknowledged as a pointer toward the possi-
bility of restructuring the founding premises of the
discipline.
The Location of Architecture
As A History of Architecture and Usul-u Mimari-i
Osmani exemplify, the schism between architecture
and culture appears most strikingly in architectural
history texts. This is hardly surprising, as history
plays an irreducible role in perpetuating the canon
by means of its narrative structure. Narrativization,
by denition, imposes consistence, coherence, regu-
larity, and fullness on phenomena, which might oth-
erwise be disparate and incommensurable. This
imposition requires a common ground, an ahistorical
reference that enables the translation of difference
into similarity. Slavoj Zizek insists that “every ver-
sion of historicism relies on a minimal ‘ahistorical’
formal framework dening the terrain within which
the open and endless game of contingent inclu-
sions/exclusions, substitutions, renegotiations, dis-
placements, and so on, takes place.”34 Architecture
as a universal signier becomes the ahistorical refer-
ence for historical narratives. Architectures of differ-
ent cultures are then seen as merely different ver-
sions of architecture. They are conveniently
appropriated into the grand narrative of architec-
tural history without acknowledging that it has been
canonized at a particular time and in a particular
geographical location. This narrative historicizes
architecture, without questioning the historicity of
its structuring principles. It involves the narrativiza-
tion of a naturalized, presumably universal denition
of architecture.
Zizek’s distinction between historicism and his-
toricity is particularly useful here. He states that
“historicism deals with the endless play of substitu-
tions within the same fundamental eld of
(im)possibility, while historicity proper makes the-
matic different structural principles of this very
(im)possibility.”35 In terms of my own argument,
architectural historical narratives deal with increasing
numbers of cultures without acknowledging that the
structuring principles of architecture are historically
constituted and that, as an identity category, the
fullness of architecture is always already an impossi-
bility. When architectural difference is reduced to
cultural difference, other architectures can be
relentlessly incorporated within the established
boundaries of the discipline. The question then is
what if architectural discourse recognized its own
repression in the production of cultural others. What
if it recognized its own limits, the conditions of its
own construction before naming other things simply
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as architectures of other cultures? Maybe it will
then be possible to see that other architectures do
not necessarily exist outside the homelands of ex-
colonizers but outside the given boundaries of
architecture. Although architectures of other cul-
tures can easily be assimilated into the architectural
canon and serve hegemonic cultural hierarchies,
other architectures offer the possibility to question
the boundaries of the discipline. They may enable
the recognition of the impossibility of the fullness
of architecture and the historicity of its canonical
premises.
Focusing on the historical transformations of
the very notion of architecture would enable a shift
of focus from cultural diversity to cultural differ-
ence. Cultural diversity, according to Homi Bhabha,
is a category of comparative ethics and aesthetics
that emphasizes liberal notions of multiculturalism
and cultural exchange. Cultural difference, on the
other hand, “focuses on the problem of the ambiva-
lence of cultural authority: the attempt to dominate
in the name of a cultural supremacy which is itself
produced only in the moment of differentiation.”36
In architectural terms, thinking in terms of cultural
difference surfaces the schism between (Western)
architecture and its others and renders visible the
ambivalence that is inherent in the conception of
architecture as a unitary and stable identity cate-
gory. The architectural canon can afford to parade
as universal only to the extent that it relegates his-
torical difference to the cultural eld. Once archi-
tecture is dissociated from cultural identity catego-
ries, one is liberated to see other than what is
given-to-be-seen by the canonical premises of the
discipline.37 Questioning the relationship between
architecture and culture involves problematizing
architecture as an identity category as much as
questioning culture as an architectural category. To
assume an unproblematical link between architec-
tural and cultural identication means to overlook
the dissociation between that which signies and
that which is signied, which Vitruvius proclaimed
two thousand years ago.
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